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Abstract
In the field of medically assisted reproduction (MAR), there is a growing emphasis on the importance of introducing new 
assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) only after thorough preclinical safety research, including the use of animal mod-
els. At the same time, there is international support for the three R’s (replace, reduce, refine), and the European Union even 
aims at the full replacement of animals for research. The apparent tension between these two trends underlines the urgency 
of an explicit justification of the use of animals for the development and preclinical testing of new ARTs. Considering that 
the use of animals remains necessary for specific forms of ART research and taking account of different views on the moral 
importance of helping people to have a genetically related child, we argue that, in principle, the importance of safety research 
as part of responsible innovation outweighs the limited infringement of animal wellbeing involved in ART research.
Keywords Ethics · Assisted reproductive technologies · Responsible innovation · Animal research · The three Rs
Introduction
Several authors have pointed out that all too often, the intro-
duction of new ARTs has taken place on a trial and error 
basis, thus exposing women and their future children to 
potential harms of procedures that are possibly risky and of 
unclear benefit (Dondorp and de Wert 2011; Harper et al. 
2012; Provoost et al. 2014; Van; Steirteghem 2008). There 
is a growing awareness of the importance of making pre-
clinical efficacy and safety research part of the responsi-
ble introduction of new assisted reproductive technologies 
(ARTs). In order to achieve this, the field is called upon to 
heed existing guidelines (ESHRE) stating that new reproduc-
tive technologies should, where possible, be developed and 
tested in preclinical research using animals and/or human 
embryos (Pennings et al. 2007). However, whilst ensuring 
that new ARTs are safe and beneficial is an ethically rec-
ommendable aim, these types of research (on animals and 
human embryos) are also morally sensitive, thus raising the 
question how innovation in medically assisted reproduction 
can responsibly be achieved. In this paper, we will specifi-
cally address the ethics of preclinical animal research in this 
context.
As we will explain in the "Background" section, the 
recent emphasis on the need for such studies in the field of 
assisted reproduction coincides with simultaneous public 
concerns and policy efforts in international research gov-
ernance to minimize the use of animals in scientific research 
(NC3Rs 2013; Pijnappel 2016; Ormandy et al. 2014; von 
Roten 2013). The European Union has even embraced the 
complete phasing out of animal research as a goal for Euro-
pean legislation (European Commission 2015). It seems that 
the call for more rather than less preclinical animal studies 
in the field of assisted reproduction is out of tune with these 
policy aims. The least one can say is that this call comes 
at a time where the justification for the use of animals in 
research can no longer be taken for granted. The apparent 
tension between these two trends underlines the urgency of 
an ethical exploration of whether and under what conditions 
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research involving the preclinical development and testing of 
new ARTs in animals would be acceptable. Surprisingly, our 
study is the first to explore this specific question, thus filling 
an important lacuna relevant to the fields both of assisted 
reproduction and ethics of animal research.
We start our discussion from the assumption, also under-
lying the current ethical framework for animal research, that 
animals may be used for scientifically valid studies under the 
conditions of subsidiarity and proportionality (section “The 
ethical framework for animal research”). The first of these 
principles drives the question whether animals are actually 
needed to achieve the research aims. We address this issue 
in section “Alternatives for using animals to test new ARTs”. 
We argue that given the specific aims of testing new ARTs, 
a full replacement for using animals is not realistic. The 
second principle (proportionality) requires an analysis of 
the moral weight of the aims served by the research held 
against the moral costs in terms of animal welfare. As will be 
explained in section “Proportionality of using animals to test 
new ARTs”, two lines of argument need to be distinguished: 
the moral weight of helping people to have (genetically own 
and healthy) children and the importance of making sure that 
ARTs are only offered when safe and of proven benefit. As 
we will argue, the strength of the latter argument only counts 
in the light of a positive assessment of the weight of former. 
The final section contains concluding remarks.
Background
The growing awareness of the importance 
of preclinical research for new ARTs
As Joyce Harper and colleagues have pointed out, many new 
ARTs “have not been shown to be safe, to have a clear clini-
cal benefit and/or not been properly validated” before their 
introduction into clinical practice, which is a “very worry-
ing situation that may become even more common as new 
technologies are developed” (Harper et al. 2012). In vitro 
fertilization (IVF), intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), 
the cryopreservation of embryos, ooplasm transfer, and most 
recently oocyte vitrification, in vitro oocyte maturation and 
‘Augment’ treatment are examples of ARTs that have been 
introduced into clinical practice without much preclinical 
research (Harper et al. 2012; Dondorp and de Wert 2011; 
Motluk 2015). However, the past years have seen a growing 
awareness of the importance of preclinical research on new 
ARTs.
The general lack of preclinical research has, for example, 
been recognized by the Task Force on Ethics and Law of the 
European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryol-
ogy (ESHRE). In 2007, they published a statement on the 
welfare of the child in medically assisted reproduction and 
pointed out that “the widespread adoption of new techniques 
frequently takes place without the necessary evaluation of 
their efficacy (…), safety and social and economic conse-
quences” (Pennings et al. 2007). This exposes women and 
children to potential risks inherent in the technologies and 
treatments. These risks include the potential for inducing 
genetic and epigenetic alterations which may result in lower 
developmental competence and/or health problems in off-
spring thus conceived. For example, research has shown 
that the use of different culture media leads to differences in 
birthweight in the resulting babies (Dumoulin et al. 2010).
Animal research in ART 
To test the efficacy and safety of new ARTs, ESHRE recom-
mends a research chain consisting of four steps; (a) animal 
studies, (b) preclinical embryo research, (c) clinical trials 
and (d) follow-up studies (Pennings et al. 2007). This paper 
will focus solely on the first step; animal studies. Where 
animal studies are concerned, ARTs are tested at different 
stages of reproduction and animal development: studying 
gametes, preimplantation embryos, fetuses, and offspring 
in several generations. For these studies, animals are used 
in different ways: either directly: as the research model to 
be studied, or indirectly: as providers of those models, when 
animals are used as a source of gametes or as carriers of 
fetuses. As animals are needed also for research only look-
ing at gametes or in vitro embryos, those studies qualify as 
‘animal research’ as well.
The first steps of developing a new ART are often per-
formed in vitro (e.g. use of human cell lines or early animal 
embryos). Thereafter, animal in vivo embryos, fetuses and 
born offspring will be tested. The nature of the precise pro-
cedures depends on the research question. For example, in 
the context of developing Stem Cell Derived (SCD) gametes, 
animal embryos created with gametes procured with this 
technology may be used to investigate possible epigenetic 
effects. After transfer to the womb, animal fetuses grown 
from such embryos may subsequently be used to test devel-
opmental potential. Thereafter, any resulting offspring may 
be tested for abnormalities, including an evaluation of their 
reproductive health, and of possible effects upon offspring 
in further generations.
The insight animal models can give in epigenetic, devel-
opmental and transgenerational effects is a significant ben-
efit compared to other types of preclinical research (Brison 
et al. 2013). Moreover, in contrast to follow-up research in 
humans, animal follow-up research can be performed in a 
relatively short period. In practice, this means that mul-
tiple generations of animals generated by a new ART are 
observed and subjected to several tests during their lives, 
such as weight measurements and blood tests.
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Often, rodents such as mice or rats are used for efficacy 
and safety research on ARTs, because of their physiologi-
cal resemblance to humans, the extensive basic knowledge 
on these animal models and the possibility to perform 
transgenerational research in a short time span. When the 
new ART is tested successfully in lower mammals, such 
as mice or rats, it may be tested on other species (includ-
ing non-human primates) that allow a better translation of 
the research outcomes to humans. For example, although 
mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT) resulted in the 
birth of live offspring in the mouse model, when applied on 
human oocytes, a significant amount of mtDNA from the 
nuclear donor (patient) was apparently transmitted to the 
reconstructed embryos. Therefore, the technique would be 
inappropriate for patients with mtDNA-associated diseases 
(Tachibana et al. 2009). To investigate how the transmis-
sion of mtDNA could be prevented, researchers have used a 
non-human primate model, in which they successfully used 
spindle transfer (ST) whereby no mtDNA was transmitted 
(Tachibana et al. 2009).
The three Rs as a policy aim
Simultaneous with the realization that more preclinical 
research, including animal research, is needed in the ART 
field, there is growing international support for the Three Rs 
(replace, reduce and refine the use of animals in research) 
(NC3Rs 2013; Pijnappel 2016). Many scientific journals, 
such as Human Reproduction, explicitly request that authors 
follow the Three Rs (Human Reproduction 2018). According 
to the principles of the Three Rs, researchers using animals 
should show that there are no other scientific methods to 
conduct their research and how they aim to minimize animal 
numbers and suffering.
In the past few years, the growing support of the Three 
Rs has resulted in increased regulations on animal research 
conform to the Three Rs (European Commission 2010; 
NC3Rs 2013). The 2010 European Union’s regulations on 
the protection of animals used for scientific purposes took 
full effect in 2013, and replaced the old regulations from 
1986. The goal of the new Directive is to “strengthen legisla-
tion, and improve the welfare of those animals still needed 
to be used, as well as to firmly anchor the principle of the 
Three Rs, to replace, reduce and refine the use of animals, 
in EU legislation” (European Commission 2010). The Three 
Rs are directly incorporated in the Directive, as it states that 
“animal studies should be either replaced by methods not 
involving animals, or adapted to reduce the number of ani-
mals needed, or refined to minimize pain, suffering or dis-
tress experienced by the animal, or to increase their welfare. 
If an alternative approach to achieve a research objective is 
available, the Directive makes its use mandatory” (European 
Commission 2015). This means that, on a European level, 
researchers using animals have to show that they incorporate 
the Three Rs in order to get approval for their research. The 
ethical justification on this policy will be provided in the 
next section.
The need for more animal research in the ART field and 
the growing international support for the Three Rs seem 
to lead in opposite directions. On the one hand, there is an 
acknowledged need for doing more animal research as part 
of the responsible introduction of new ARTs while at the 
same time the wider message is that we should as much 
as possible avoid using animals for research. As both these 
claims refer to ethical principles, the question is how this 
tension can be resolved in an ethically acceptable way. How 
should the ART field respond to this tension and what does it 
mean for safety research using animals on emerging ARTs?
The ethical framework for animal research
The acceptability of animal research is a highly debated 
subject in the field of bioethics as well as in the societal and 
political domain (Ormandy et al. 2014; von Roten 2013). 
The positions in this debate are often portrayed as being 
essentially between the biomedical and animal protection 
communities, diametrically opposing one another (DeGrazia 
2003; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2005). Emma Marris, 
reporter of Nature, speaks of “a ping-pong game between 
hard-core activists and hard-core defenders”, in which “any-
one in the middle who stands up to be heard risks getting 
hit” (Marris 2006, p. 810). However, in that middle ground, 
an ethical framework has been developed for the accept-
able use of animals in research for which there is in fact 
considerable consensus (DeGrazia 2003; Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics 2005).
The ethical framework recognizes that as sentient beings, 
animals have a moral status that needs to be taken seriously. 
A being has moral status, if it has interests which can be 
harmed (Singer 1995). The moral status of animals means 
that we are obliged to consider their needs and interests 
when making decisions affecting them (Warren 1997). 
Applying this to the practice of animal research, the frame-
work insists that animals are as much as reasonably possible 
treated with respect to their well-being, which also includes 
allowing them to live the typical life of a representative of 
their species. As the qualifier (‘as much as reasonably pos-
sible’) indicates, not every infringement on animal wellbe-
ing is as such regarded as reprehensible. However, recogni-
tion of their moral status entails that any such infringement 
requires a justification. The obvious candidate justification 
for animal research is that it would further the interests of 
humans in the development of new knowledge and better 
medical technologies. The framework specifies the condi-
tions for this justification in terms of two requirements; (1) 
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that the benefits to be derived from animal research can-
not be obtained through other, less morally problematic, 
means (principle of subsidiarity) and (2) that the level of 
infringement on animal wellbeing is proportional to the 
moral weight of those benefits (principle of proportional-
ity) (European Commission 2010). In practice, this means 
that an animal ethics committee assessing a protocol for ani-
mal research must agree that the research meets both these 
requirements.
Implicit in this ethical framework is the notion that ani-
mal research always comes at a moral price. Its justifica-
tion therefore requires not only that, with regard to specific 
research protocols, this price can be shown to be the lesser 
of two evils (with refraining from research as the larger one), 
but also that accepting the practice of animal research should 
come with a general and continuing commitment on the part 
of society to as much as possible reduce (and ideally avoid) 
this implicit moral price. This is reflected in the concept 
of the 3Rs (NC3Rs 2016). Although the concept, with its 
emphasis on minimizing the use of animals and improving 
the welfare of those still being used, was already developed 
over fifty years ago, it is increasingly seen today as a context 
for overcoming the moral disagreement between the bio-
medical and the animal protection communities (Pijnappel 
2016).
Alternatives for using animals to test new 
ARTs
The principle of subsidiarity drives the question whether 
animals are actually needed to achieve the research aims. 
As discussed in the “Background” section, animal research 
can give insight in the risks of a certain technology and may 
help to reduce these risks before applying the technology to 
humans. Are there alternative methods with less invasive 
means than animal research to investigate new ARTs?
Elsewhere in medicine, alternatives for the use of animals 
in preclinical research have been found in computer models, 
the use of alternative organisms, such as lower microorgan-
isms (e.g. yeasts), and the use of animal/human in vitro cell 
and tissue cultures (Doke et al. 2015). Bearing in mind the 
nature of ART research described in the “Background” sec-
tion, it is implausible that these models can replace all ART 
animal research, as they cannot provide information on the 
development of embryos and fetuses, nor on the health of 
(multigenerational) offspring. For example, in studies inves-
tigating the safety of spermatogonial stem cell transplan-
tation (SSCT) and testicular tissue grafting (TTG), there 
were no alternatives for animal research when testing for 
epigenetic effects in multigenerational offspring (Goossens 
et al. 2009, 2011). The use of animal/human in vitro cell 
and tissue cultures or the use of e.g. organoids may be an 
interesting option to reduce the use of animals for research 
(Lancaster et al. 2014). However, since many research pro-
cedures, such as performing transgenerational research, are 
impossible in this model, they will only have limited value.
A possibly important method to minimize the use of 
animals, which has not been given much attention yet as 
an alternative to animal research in the literature, can be 
research on human embryos in vitro (i.e. preclinical human 
embryo research). Embryo research enables researchers to 
test offspring for abnormalities in an early stage of life. For 
instance, molecular studies on preimplantation embryos 
can be useful to yield information on epigenetic re-pro-
gramming. Moreover, the use of human embryos can also 
be helpful to avoid translation problems: “Preferentially and 
where possible, studies should be done on human embryos, 
as results from animal studies cannot always be extrapolated 
to humans” (De Rycke et al. 2002).
Proposing human embryo research as an alternative pre-
supposes that the use of human embryos as research material 
is morally less problematic than that of animals, since the 
subsidiarity principle should be met. This, however, seems 
to run against the widely held view that the opposite is the 
case: that human embryos have a higher moral status and 
deserve more respect than animals. For instance, in many 
jurisdictions that allow human embryo research under con-
ditions, one of those conditions is that the envisaged results 
cannot be obtained through other methods, including animal 
research. The British Warnock report explicitly states that 
human embryos should only be used when research with 
animal models is not an option (Warnock 1985). The same 
view is reflected in ESHRE’s account of a research chain in 
which human embryo studies are described as the next step, 
only after preceding animal studies have led to reassuring 
data (Pennings et al. 2007). Interestingly, the subsidiarity 
principle underlying the call for replacing animal research 
also applies to human embryo research. This means that, 
when holding on to the view that human embryos have a 
higher moral status than animals, the proposition of using 
human embryo research to replace animal research collides 
with the condition to only perform human embryo research 
when animal research is not an option.
We however do not find it obvious that the use of ani-
mal models is indeed morally less problematic than human 
embryo research. Firstly, animal research inevitably entails 
an infringement of animal wellbeing whereas human 
embryos cannot experience pain or discomfort. Secondly, as 
reflected in the acceptance of occasioning left-over embryos 
in IVF-practice, the moral status of human preimplantation 
embryos is relatively low (Harman 1999; Steinbock 2011; 
Gezondheidsraad 1998). How the conflict between these 
readings of the subsidiarity principle should be resolved 
is a matter for further debate and analysis that should also 
include the possible scenario of extending human embryo 
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research beyond the current 14-day limit (Hyun et al. 2016), 
if that could yield important information about the safety of 
a new technology. To the extent that human embryo research 
can indeed be considered as morally less rather than more 
problematic than using animals for the same purpose, pre-
sent accounts of the order of the ideal chain of types of 
preclinical safety research need to be revised. Even so, as 
human embryo research will not provide data beyond the 
earliest stages of development, it cannot be expected to pro-
vide more than a partial replacement of the use of animals 
for testing new ARTs.
Proportionality of using animals to test new 
ARTs
The conclusion that animal research remains necessary for 
the responsible introduction of new ARTs is only a first step 
in determining the ethical acceptability of such research. 
The next step concerns the question whether the aims served 
with ART research are important enough to justify the use 
of animals. Whereas in the previous section we explored 
whether the subsidiarity principle was met, we now turn to 
the question of whether such research is also proportional. 
To answer this question, we need to explore what is in the 
scales on both sides of the balance. On the moral cost side, 
we first need to get a clearer picture of what precisely is 
at stake in terms of the impact on animal wellbeing where 
testing animals for ART research is concerned. We will then 
move on to the other side of the balance in order to discuss 
whether the moral benefits of ART research are substantial 
enough to outweigh the moral cost.
The moral cost of using animals for ART research
In the “Background” section, we described the research 
process using animals in different stages of their lives. 
How do these research procedures translate to moral cost 
in terms of compromised animal welfare and animal suf-
fering? To perform animal gamete or embryo research 
in vitro, oocytes and sperm need to be isolated from full 
grown animals. In some species, such as cattle, research-
ers can use spare material from abattoirs to retrieve gam-
etes. In most other species, however, such as in the mouse 
model, females must undergo hormone stimulation. The 
injections lead to short and light pain for the animals, but 
the hormone stimulation itself does not lead to animal dis-
tress. The mice will be euthanized and their reproductive 
tissues removed, after which oocytes are collected from the 
fallopian tubes of females and sperm from the epididymis 
of males. Hormonal stimulation of the females is also a 
first step in research involving animal embryos in vivo. A 
few days after mating, the carrier will be euthanized and 
its fallopian tubes and uterus removed in order to allow 
the isolation of fertilized oocytes (or embryos). Fetuses 
and newborn animals will be euthanized prior to being 
tested, for instance for epigenetic abnormalities. To test 
the adults, a piece of tissue will be removed which may be 
slightly painful, but that is something that can be avoided 
by sedation. Thereafter, the tissue will be tested. Ulti-
mately, most research animals will be euthanized when 
they are no longer useful for the research (except for e.g. 
nonhuman primates).
How do we evaluate the moral cost of these proce-
dures? If one wants to assess animal research for a specific 
research project, the moral cost depends on what proce-
dures are needed for answering the precise research ques-
tion and concerns elements such as the number of animals 
used, the use of anesthetics and which animal species are 
needed. Here, we want to assess the moral cost of animal 
research on ARTs in comparison to other practices using 
animals. Several accepted animal research practices are 
highly invasive. For instance, in studies aimed at devel-
oping therapies for cancer or burn injuries, animals are 
exposed to conditions that may cause significant suffering 
as a result of tumor growth or inflicted burns (Abdullahi 
et al. 2014; Workman et al. 2010). Animal research on 
ARTs, on the contrary, is much less invasive, since animals 
will be at most subjected to short and light pain and are 
killed painlessly instead of being subjected to significant 
suffering. As explained by philosopher Jeff McMahan, the 
general view is that “it is more important to prevent the 
significant suffering of animals than it is to prevent, or not 
to cause, their deaths” (McMahan 2002). We conclude that 
the harm done to animals in ART research is, in compari-
son to cancer or burn research, relatively low, resulting in 
a relatively low moral cost.
Comparing animal research on ARTs to another widely 
accepted practice of animal use, namely the social practice 
of eating meat, invites the same conclusion that animal 
research on ART has a relatively low moral cost. Whereas 
animal research should always meet strict rules in accord-
ance with the principles of the Three Rs, these principles 
are not incorporated by the food industry. Consequently, 
research animals are generally treated with more respect and 
are subjected to less suffering (e.g. using anesthetics, proper 
housing) than food industry animals.
As animal research on ARTs comes with a relatively low 
level of harm, the moral cost of these procedures is low 
in comparison with that of other generally accepted ani-
mal research practices and with the use of animals in the 
meat industry. Nevertheless, since also in animal research 
on ARTs, animals suffer some degree of pain or are killed, 
their use as research models is in need of justification. This 
leads to the question whether the moral cost is proportional 
to the potential benefits.
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Justifying aims of animal research: human health 
as a benchmark
In line with the ethical framework discussed in sec-
tion  “The  ethical framework for animal research”, the 
European Directive refers to “the avoidance, prevention, 
diagnosis or treatment of disease, ill-health or other abnor-
mality or their effects in human being” as justifying aims of 
animal research (European Commission 2010). This reflects 
the widely shared notion that health is such a vital need 
for humans that if animal research can ever be regarded as 
serving a sufficiently important aim, it must be for health. 
If we take this as the upper end of a spectrum of considered 
acceptability, then most cosmetics research would be found 
at the lower end. Longstanding ethical concerns about the 
proportionality of the use of animals for consumer cosmet-
ics has led to an official ban of this practice in the entire 
European Union since 2013 (European Commission 2009). 
Apart from the availability of possible alternative methods 
for safety-testing, an important reason for this is that devel-
oping products that merely cater to consumer preferences 
is not regarded as sufficiently weighty to justify the inevi-
table infringement of animal wellbeing. Taking the uncon-
tested value of health as a benchmark, our question thus 
becomes where on this spectrum the benefits provided by 
ART research are to be positioned.
This question cannot simply be answered by pointing to 
the fact that the relevant research is meant to protect humans 
from possible health risks connected to untested technolo-
gies. While this is a necessary element of any justification 
of the use of animals for preclinical safety studies, it is not 
sufficient to make the case. As with regard to consumer cos-
metics, whether the use of the relevant technology would be 
safe only becomes a proportionality affecting issue when 
it is first established that the use of the technology as such 
serves a morally weighty aim. Therefore, the proportionality 
question should be addressed on two levels. We will start our 
assessment on the first level, where it is questioned whether 
the benefits of MAR are important enough to justify the use 
of animals. Only when this criterion can be met, the step can 
be made to the second level, where it is questioned whether 
the aims of ART research are important enough to justify 
the use of animals.
The moral importance of medically assisted 
reproduction
With regard to the first level, the aim for which MAR was 
originally developed, i.e. helping people with fertility prob-
lems to have children, has led to a long debate about whether 
infertility should be regarded as a disease (Holm 1996). 
Reasons for an affirmative answer (Zegers-Hochschild et al. 
2017) are that on the level of biological functioning, fertility 
problems can be ascribed to observable or presumed abnor-
malities in the reproductive system. Although MAR does not 
take away or ‘cure’ those abnormalities, it provides fertility 
patients with something (a child) for which reproductively 
healthy couples need no medical help. Clearly, for those tak-
ing this view, developing new ARTs for people with fertility 
problems is a matter of developing health care, putting the 
importance of the needed research in the higher end of the 
spectrum.
Others have however argued that infertility is not so much 
a disease, but rather a (social) handicap (Holm 1996). In 
their view, childlessness becomes a problem in the context 
of societal expectations and personal desires, rather than 
as a direct consequence of a biological abnormality. This 
also connects with the idea that for those who regard their 
childlessness as a problem, there are other options for having 
a child, thus relativizing the importance of developing new 
ARTs. For example, adoption is an alternative to medical 
treatment, or having a child through low-tech donor insemi-
nation is an alternative to high-tech ICSI. This might lead 
to the conclusion that the importance of developing new 
ARTs is relatively low. However, the value that many people 
place on having a child with a genetic link to (ideally) both 
partners, points in the opposite direction and is an important 
driver for developing new ARTs capable of providing just 
that: a child of which both partners are the genetic parents.
Currently, ARTs are not only being developed to help 
the infertile to have genetically related children, but also to 
help other people, regardless of their fertility status. Future 
MAR options using SCD-gametes will to a large extent 
serve that aim. This might also make it possible for people 
who are unable to reproduce due to their sexual orienta-
tion, relationship status or age to have a genetically related 
child. For women who for whatever reason expect not to be 
able to fulfill their child-wish prior to running out of func-
tional oocytes, the development of SCD-gametes will also 
make oocyte or ovarian tissue cryopreservation redundant. 
Since it is obvious that when dealing with this wider range 
of requests, MAR does not respond to a health problem and 
that for those involved there may be alternative routes to 
having a child, the question becomes how the importance of 
these reproductive services relates to the uncontested value 
of human health on the one end of the spectrum and the 
trivial importance of consumer cosmetics on the other.
A specific form of MAR entails helping people to have 
children who are not only genetically related, but also 
healthy. This concerns people who may or may not have 
a fertility problem, but who want to avoid having a child 
with a genetic disorder that they are at risk of transmitting. 
MAR treatments that will allow them to have a child without 
the specific genetic disease include PGD, MRT, or possi-
bly germline gene editing (CRISPR-cas9) in the future. In 
terms of our spectrum, treatments to avoid the transmission 
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of genetic diseases might be regarded as falling in the cat-
egory of health. The argument behind this reasoning is that a 
healthy child can only be realized by ensuring that the child 
is born without the genetic defects of which their parents 
are healthy or affected carriers. However, to realize the aim 
of having a healthy child, parents can also choose for using 
donor gametes or adoption instead of medical treatment. 
Nevertheless, many patients choose the latter option, despite 
the invasiveness of ART treatments. This shows, again, that 
there is apparently a socially determined motive for prefer-
ring the options leading to a genetically related child over 
other alternatives.
As it appears most appropriate to say that the practice of 
MAR serves the aim of helping people to have a genetically 
related child, our question about the moral weight of devel-
oping new ARTs requires an assessment of the importance 
of this aim. Although research has shown that there are no 
significant differences considering psychological well-being 
between biologically and non-biologically related parents 
and children (Golombok et al. 2004, 2006; Lansford et al. 
2001), and although some commentators have called the 
preference to have genetically related children ‘irrational’ 
(Holm 1996; Bayles 1984), it is clear that many people do 
consider the genetic link to be very important. For instance, 
the decision to establish a family through donor concep-
tion is often only made after a long process of failed ART 
treatments with the prospective parents’ own gametes and 
coming to terms with this situation may for many be pos-
sible only after a period of serious grieving. Moreover, what 
are often presented as alternative ways of having a child are 
not always available due to strict conditions (adoption) or 
scarcity (donor oocytes) or come with challenges of their 
own. For example, the abolishment of donor anonymity 
in a growing number of countries (which in itself can be 
regarded as reflecting an increased societal emphasis on the 
importance of the genetic link (Pennings 2012)) has made 
donor conception less attractive to many couples who are 
weary about future contact of their child with the donor and 
the possible role that the donor may want to play in their 
family (Brewaeys et al. 2005).
We acknowledge that given the different views about the 
importance of the genetic link, MAR cannot be said to serve 
a vital human need in the same way some other medical 
interventions do. However, it would neither be correct to say 
that it serves a trivial preference. Given that those different 
views connect to the plurality of understandings of what a 
flourishing life means, and in the light of the value attached 
to that plurality in our liberal society, we argue that the prac-
tice of MAR does indeed serve a morally weighty aim.
Is MAR important enough to justify the use of animals in 
research aimed at improving the practice (if no alternative 
methods are available)? We see two reasons for arguing that 
it is. Firstly, as long as the large-scale use of animals for 
food, where alternatives are readily available in the form of 
vegetarian or vegan lifestyles, is considered morally accept-
able by society, it seems difficult to maintain that research 
aimed at improving MAR would not be sufficiently impor-
tant. Secondly, the earlier observation that, also in compari-
son with the use of animals in the meat industry, preclinical 
ART research has a relatively low impact on animal wellbe-
ing, further supports this conclusion.
The proportionality of preclinically testing new 
ARTs
If the above reasoning is sound, the argument on the next 
level can be more straightforward. Here we are concerned 
with the moral importance of preclinically testing new ARTs 
for efficacy and safety. Testing the efficacy of a new ART 
prior to its clinical introduction is important to avoid sub-
jecting women (and sometimes men) to potentially risky 
treatment without sufficient benefit. Testing its safety also 
concerns the health of children and future generations. 
Although animal research can never guarantee the safety of 
a new technology, testing ARTs in animal models prior to 
introducing them in the clinic can reduce the risk that chil-
dren conceived through these technologies may be born with 
malformations or experience health problems during the rest 
of their lives. The fact that only few such health effects of 
new ARTs have until now emerged cannot be a reason for 
complacency in this regard (Dondorp and de Wert 2011). As 
embryologist Anne McLaren has famously said, the direct 
clinical introduction of untested new ARTs can be compared 
with ‘making the first test of a new aircraft-guidance system 
on a crowded Boeing 747’ (McLaren 1989). As this regards 
human health related concerns that as such fall on the higher 
end of the spectrum of justificatory aims of animal research, 
we conclude that a strong case can be made that, in prin-
ciple, the use of animals for testing new ARTs would be 
proportional.
Concluding remarks
Considering that the use of animals remains necessary for 
specific forms of ART research and taking account of dif-
ferent views of the moral importance of helping people to 
have a genetically related child, we argue that, in princi-
ple, the importance of safety research as part of responsible 
innovation outweighs the limited infringement of animal 
wellbeing involved in ART research. In principle, because 
the proportionality of concrete instances of animal research 
still depends on the specifics of the case. As animal research 
inevitably comes at a moral price, it remains important to 
constantly consider to what extent the ideal of the 3Rs can be 
better met. Although a full replacement of animal research 
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on new ARTs is not realistic, possible alternatives including 
the use of human embryos should be considered in concrete 
cases.
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